In the Middle of the Heat The GCC Countries Between Rising Oil Prices and the Sliding Greenback by Weshah Razzak
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE HEAT 
The GCC COUNTRIES BETWEEN 







             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
                        
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             














Dr. Weshah Razzak, The Arab Planning Institute, P.O. Box: 5834 Safat. 13059 Kuwait, 
Tel: (965) 4843130, Fax: (965) 4842935, E-mail: weshah@api.org.kw. 
 
 
  0In the Middle of the Heat 
The GCC Countries Between Rising Oil  






The paper asks two questions. One, what is the size of the effect of the increase in real oil price 
on competitiveness of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries –the real exchange rate is a measure 
of competitiveness – and two, given recent concerns about the sliding greenback and the consequent 
income and inflationary problems, would the GCC countries been “better off” had they pegged their 
currencies to the Euro dollar in 1991?  To answer these questions we model and estimate the effect of oil 
prices on the competitiveness for the GCC then we provide a test statistic to test whether the conditional 
variance of the model has remained stable under the US dollar peg compared to a counterfactual scenario, 
where the GCC countries peg their currencies to the Euro dollar in 1991.  We find the effect of the 
increase in the real price of oil on competitiveness of the GCC countries to be small, most of the domestic 
inflation is imported, and that there is a relatively large variation among the GCC economies with respect 
to the currency peg.  The financial problems the GCC countries face today are not about which currency 
(or a basket of currencies) they should peg to, but rather about the choice of the monetary arrangement as 
a whole.   
 ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﺭﻻﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﺮﻄﻣﻭ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﻥﺍﺪﻨﺳ ﲔﺑ  
ﺺﺨﻠﻣ  
 
   ﻩﺬﻫ ﺍ ﻗﺭﻮﻟ ﺔ   ﺴﺗ  ﺄ   ﲔﻟﺍﺆﺳ ﻝ  . ًﻻﻭﺃ ،       ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﻘﻴﻘﳊﺍ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺮﻌﺳ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﺍ ﲑﺛﺄﺗ ﻢﺠﺣ ﻮﻫ ﺎﻣ  ﺍ ﺭﺪﻘﻟ ﺓ     ﻥﻭﺎـﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲـﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺪﻟ ﺔﻴﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ  ﺍ    ﻲـﺠﻴﻠﳋ –  
    ﺱﺎـﻘﺗ ﺚـﻴﺣ ﺍ ﺭﺪــﻘﻟ ﺓ    ﻲـﻘﻴﻘﳊﺍ ﻑﺮـﺼﻟﺍ ﺮﻌــﺴﺑ ﺔﻴـﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ   . ﺎــﻴ￿ﺎﺛ ،   ًﺍﺮـﻈ￿  ﻡﺎــﻤﺘﻫﻼﻟ         ﺕﺎــﻌﺒﺗ ﻦـﻣ ﻚــﻟﺫ ﻖـﺤﻠﺗ ﺎــﻣﻭ ﻲـﻜﻳﺮﻣﻷﺍ ﺭﻻﻭﺪـﻟﺍ ﺽﺎــﻔﳔﺎﺑ ﺪـﻳﺍﺰﺘﳌﺍ 
ﻱﺪﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﻢﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﻞﺧﺪﻟﺍ ﺹﻮﺼﲞ ،  ﻦﻜﳝ ﻥﺎﻛ ﻞﻫ  ﺃ  ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﻲﻫ ﺎﳑ ﻞﻀﻓﺃ ﻊﺿﻭ ﰲ ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺩ ﻥﻮﻜﺗ ﻥ ﺍ ﻵ  ﺎﲥﻼﻤﻋ ﺖﻄﺑﺭ ﻮﻟ ﺎﻤﻴﻓ ﻥ
      ﻡﺎﻋ ﰲ ﺭﻻﻭﺩ ﻭﺭﻮﻴﻟﺎﺑ 1991   ﻺﻟﻭ ؟ ﺑﺎﺟ ﺔ        ﲑﺛﺄﺗ ﺱﺎﻴﻗﻭ ﺔﺟﺬﻤﻨﺑ ﻡﻮﻘ￿ ﲔﻟﺍﺆﺴﻟﺍ ﻦﻳﺬﻫ ﻰﻠﻋ                ﻲـﻘﻴﻘﳊﺍ ﻑﺮـﺼﻟﺍ ﺮﻌـﺳ ﻰـﻠﻋ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺮﻌﺳ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﺍ  )    ﺱﺎـﻴﻘﻤﻛ
  ﺔﻴـﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺪـﻘﻠﻟ  (              ﻥﺎـﻛ ﺍﺫﺇ ﺎـﻤﻴﻓ ﺭﺎـﺒﺘﺧﻻ ﻲﺋﺎـﺼﺣﺇ ﺭﺎـﺒﺘﺧﺍ ﻡﺪـﻘ￿ ﻚﻟﺬـﻛﻭ ﻲـﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎـﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲـﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺪـﻟ "   ﻁﻭﺮـﺸﳌﺍ ﻦﻳﺎـﺒﺘﻟﺍ )  " Conditional 
Variance  (    ًﺍﺮﻘﺘﺴﻣ ﻲﻘﺑ ﺪﻗ ﺝﺫﻮﻤﻨﻠﻟ      ﻡﺎﻈ￿ ﺖﲢ  ﺍ        ﺕﻼﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻪﻴﻓ ﺖﻄﺑﺭ ﻱﺬﻟﺍ ﻑﺮﺼﻟ ﺍ ﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋ ﺔ   ﻻﻭﺪﻟﺎﺑ            ﻲـﳘﻭ ﻑﺮﺻ ﺮﻌﺳ ﻡﺎﻈ￿ ﺖﲢ ﻡﺃ ﻲﻜﻳﺮﻣﻷﺍ ﺭ
) Counterfactual  (       ﺕﻼﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻪﻴﻓ ﺖﻄﺑﺭ ﺚﻴﺣ ﺍ ﻴﺠﻴﻠﳋ ﺔ      ﻡﺎﻋ ﺬﻨﻣ ﺭﻻﻭﺩ ﻭﺭﻮﻴﻟﺎﺑ  1991  .     ﺓﺭﺪـﻘﻟﺍ ﻰـﻠﻋ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﻻ ﻒﻴﻔﻃ ﲑﺛﺄﺗ ﺎ￿ﺪﺟﻭ
    ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﻝﻭﺪﻟ ﺔﻴﺴﻓﺎﻨﺘﻟﺍ ،     ًﺍﺩﺭﻮﺘﺴﻣ ﻱﺪﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﻢﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺒﻠﻏﺃﻭ    ﺝﺭﺎﳋﺍ ﻦﻣ  ،  ﲑﺒﻛ ﻦﻳﺎﺒﺗ ﻙﺎﻨﻫﻭ         ﲑﺛﺄـﺗ ﺚـﻴﺣ ﻦـﻣ ﺲـﻠ﷟﷤ﶠﺍ ﻝﻭﺩ ﲔـﺑ ﺎﻴﺒﺴ￿
   ﺖﺑﺎﺜﻟﺍ ﻑﺮﺼﻟﺍ ﺮﻌﺳ ﻡﺎﻈ￿  .     ﻞﻛﺎﺸﳌﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺍ             ﺔﻠﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻮﺣ ﺖﺴﻴﻟ ﻡﻮﻴﻟﺍ ﺲﻠ﷟﷤ﶠﺍ ﻝﻭﺩ ﺎﻬﻬﺟﺍﻮﺗ ﱵﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﳌﺍﻭ ﺔﻳﺪﻘﻨﻟ ﺍ             ﻥﺃ ﻞـﺑ ﺎـﲥﻼﻤﻋ ﺎـﲠ ﻂﺑﺮـﺗ ﱵـﻟﺍ ﺔـﻴﺒﻨﺟﻷ
ﺍ ﻠﻜﺸﳌ ﺔ               ﻡﺎـﻋ ﻞﻜﺸﺑ ﱄﺎﳌﺍ ﻡﺎﻈﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻞﻜﻴﻫ ﻉﻮ￿ ﺪﻳﺪﲢ ﰲ ﺔﻴﻨﻌﳌﺍ ﺕﺎﻣﻮﻜﳊﺍ ﺔﺒﻏﺭ ﻝﻮﺣ  ،   ﻰـﻠﻋ      ﻝﺎـﺜﳌﺍ ﻞﻴﺒـﺳ  ،        ﺐـﻏﺮﺗ ﻞـﻫ  ﺍ   ـﻟﻭﺪﻟ ﺔ     ﺭﺍﺮﻘﺘـﺳﺎﺑ 




  1The six GCC countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) produce about 23 percent of the world’s oil and control more than 40 percent of 
the world’s oil reserves.  Oil is the main commodity they produce and export.  The spot and 
future prices of oil have been rising because of foreign excess demand, among the main reasons.   
 
Inflationary pressures increased along with recent economic growth. The size of these pressures 
depend on what index is used.  Table 1 reports the averages over the sample from 1970 to 2006 
(all data are found in appendix 1).  It reports the average GDP deflator and the CPI inflation 
rates.  It also reports the GDP deflator and the CPI inflation rates in 2006 (boldface and in 
parentheses).  Clearly, there is a lot of inflation in 2006 relative to the average, if we take the 
deflator.
1  Further, we took the average of the CPI and the deflator inflation rates for each 
country over the period then computed what we call the GCC-wide average inflation, which is 
5.5 percent.  Figure 1 shows that the deflator in each country is above the average inflation in the 
GCC countries.  The CPI, on the other hand, has been rising slowly and just about equal to the 
average in 2006.        
 
The GCC incomes grew substantially as a result of the increase in foreign demand and oil prices.  
This foreign excess demand is expected to persist.  Table 1 reports the real GDP growth rates in 
2006 (in boldface and in parentheses) and the country’s average growth rates over the sample 
from 1970 to 2006.  GDP growth rates in 2006 exceed the average growth rate over the sample, 
except in the cases of Oman and Saudi Arabia which grew at the average.
2  
 
Figure 2 is a scatter plot of the GCC GDP growth rate averages and the change in the domestic 
GDP deflator inflation rate as a proxy for the inflation’s deviation from expected inflation.   
There is a negative relationship with a small correlation coefficient equal to -0.33.  This seems to 
suggest that the dominant shock to the GCC economies has been a supply shock, i.e., perhaps an 
increase in the production, where oil has the biggest share.  Note how Bahrain and Oman seem to 
differ from the group and how Kuwait seem to be separated from the others.   
 
The GCC countries maintain fixed exchange rate regimes.  Recently, the GCC countries have 
been complaining about the continuous depreciation of the US dollar and its effect on domestic 
inflation, on their currencies, and on their incomes. Figure 3 plots the real and the nominal 
exchange rates. Figure 4 plots the US price deflator and the domestic price levels. Domestic 
prices are higher than the US price late in the sample consistent with the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.  Table 1 also reports the average real depreciation rates and their values in 2006 
(boldface and in parentheses).  The data suggest that GCC countries experienced large real 
appreciations in 2006 compared to the sample averages.
3 As a result of the fixed exchange rate 
regime inflation could be imported from abroad, which we confirm in this paper.
4      
 
So given the recent increases in incomes, the inflationary pressures and the appreciated real 
exchange rates, many of the GCC central banks and the business community have been feeling 
the heat.  The Arab Monetary Fund publicly viewed the peg to the US dollar as problematic, and 
suggested that a peg to another currency or to a basket of currencies might be a way to deal with 
the heat generated by the sliding greenback and rising oil prices. The Monetary Arab Fund did 
not consider floating the exchange rates as a good alternative. The head of the Arab Monetary 
Fund said that the float would be technically challenging to the local expertise.  A few GCC 
  2central banks, e.g., Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, decided not to change their monetary 
arrangements; given that one would expect these central banks to re-value their currencies.
5       
 
The primary aim of this paper is to understand these problems. We ask two main questions:  first, 
what is the size of the effect of the rise in the real oil price on the “competitiveness” of the GCC? 
Second, given these recent concerns about the sliding greenback and the consequences income 
and inflationary pressures, would the GCC economies have been “better off” had they pegged 
their currencies to the Euro dollar instead of the US dollar?   
 
We consider the real exchange rate a measure of competitiveness.  Our small model consists of 
four equations for the real exchange rate, real money balances, real output and the price level.  
We estimate the model and provide an answer to the first question by solving the model and 
computing the size of the effect of the increase in the real oil price on the real exchange rate.  
 
We are aware of two papers that examine the question of what basket of currencies should the 
GCC countries peg to, Erbas, et al. (2001) and Abed et al. (2003).  The first paper considered 
pegging the GCC currencies to the SDR and found out that while pegging to the SDR improves 
the stability of the exchange rates between member countries and the SDR countries (UK, 
Germany, France, and Japan), but not with the US dollar.  They found that the results are 
sensitive to the size of the estimated elasticity of exports and imports to/from the US, the SDR 
countries and to the rest of the world.  They reported that the stability gains from maintaining the 
peg to the US dollar outweighs the stability gains from switching to the SDR peg.  Abed et al. 
(2003) examined the US dollar peg versus a basket of two currencies: the US and the Euro 
dollars, and found similar results. They report that a basket-peg regime does not dominate the US 
dollar peg regime for improving the external stability.  
 
We don’t consider a scenario of a basket of currencies because the papers above already 
examined this issue.  Instead, we re-estimate the system using the Euro dollar as the measure of 
the foreign currency in the model, including the price for oil, thus we report two sets of results 
one for the US dollar system and one for the Euro dollar.  Regarding our second question, “better 
off” is measured in terms of the conditional variability of the model.  In a multivariate setup like 
ours, the conditional variance of the model is a function  called the Generalized Variance 
(Anderson, 1958).  Precisely, we compute the  Sample Generalized Variance.  And, we provide a 
test statistic to test whether the country variance has changed significantly.    
 
On average (i.e., across the GCC and over the sample period from 1970 to 2006) we found that 
the effect of the increase in the real price of oil on the real exchange rate in the short run to be 
small.  A doubling of the real price of oil appreciates the real exchange rates (reduce 
competitiveness) of the GCC countries by about 3 percent on average.  For the Euro dollar 
model, a doubling of the real price of oil measured in Euro dollar appreciates the GCC currencies 
between 0.30 and 0.70 percent on average.  This is smaller than the US dollar effect by a 
magnitude of 10.  
 
We found large differences among the GCC economies to whether they should peg to the US or 
the Euro dollar, which might have implications for the monetary union or the optimum currency 
area.  Most importantly, most of the domestic inflation comes, on average, from foreign prices 
  3(imported inflation).  Rising real oil prices by a 100 percent add about 5 percent to the GDP 
growth rate on average.  We discuss these results and policy implications.   
 
Next, we present our model.  In section 3 we derive the test statistic for the conditional variance.  
Estimation and discussion of the results are in section 4.  In Section 5 presents the calculations of 
the Sample Generalized Variance and the test statistic.  Section 6 includes our conclusions. 
 
II.  The Model 
 
The actual real exchange rate is defined as , where is the nominal exchange rate 
(the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency (i.e., an increase denotes 
depreciation),  is the foreign price, and is the domestic price.  




t P t P
 
There is a great debate in the economic literature about the exchange rate determination; it spans  
a period of more than forty years. Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) show 
that the real exchange rate is a function of the productivity differential between tradable and non-
tradable sector in the home and the foreign country.  Messe and Rogoff (1983) argue that the 
exchange rate is a random walk process.  Most asset prices follow a random walk process, which 
is also consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, e.g., Fama’s (1970) influential paper.   
But, there are also several different theories such as the monetary model and various versions of 
it, e.g., Mussa (1982, 1986), Frenkel’s (1980) real interest rate differential model, and 
Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting model.  Generally speaking, these models suggest the real 
exchange rate is perhaps a function of real money balances differential (money and inflation 
effects could be separated), output differential, and the interest rate differential. Then we had 
another generation of models, where government expenditures are the main determinant of the 
exchange rate, e.g., Edwards (1989), Froot and Rogoff (1991) and Egert, et al. (2004).   
 
It is conceivable that US variables play the most important role in affecting the real exchange 
rates of the GCC countries.  The US government massive expenditures and investments in 
defense could directly affect the real exchange rate in the GCC countries.  In countries that are 
major exporters of materials (primary commodity and metals) such as New Zealand and 
Australia, the term of trade seems to play a role in affecting the exchange rate. 
 
To encompass the models of the exchange rate determination, we assume that the real exchange 
rate has two components: a permanent component   and a transitory component  (e.g., 










t t Q Q Q + =
 
Further, we let the permanent component be a linear combination of last period actual real 
exchange rate and a vector of variables , which includes: , 
where is money,
t X t t t D TOT P M P M ˆ , , ) / ( , ) / (
*
t M
6  is the deflator, is the term of trade index and  is productivity 
differential in tradable goods, which measures the difference in tradable sector’s productivity 
between each of the GCC and their trading partners, i.e., the US, Europe and Asia).  The asterisk 
denotes the foreign country magnitude.   
t P t ToT t d ˆ
  4 
(2)       t t t
p
t X Q Q 2 1 ) 1 ( ε β β + − + = −
 
Substituting in the actual real exchange rate we get: 
 
(3)     t t t t X Q Q 3 1 ) 1 ( ε β β + − + = −  , 
 
Where the error term t 3 ε include t 2 ε and .  The real exchange rate is a random walk if
T 1 t Q = β . 
 
Under fixed exchange rate regimes the central bank buys and sells foreign assets to keep the 
exchange rate fixed so real money balances are give by:    
 





κ =  
The CPI,   is a weighted average of the domestic price deflator  and the foreign price .  
Non-oil production in the GCC is relatively small so we do not include the price of domestic 
goods.  Average non-oil production as a percent of GDP in GCC in 2002, for example, was about 






(5)      
1 1 1 * ) ( * ) ( ˆ γ γ − = S P P P t t t
 
We model real output as a function of foreign income, (which determines foreign demand), 








t R t ζ that 
includes uncertainty and other shocks. Note that in a fixed exchange rate regime, where people 
expect  (i.e., the fixed exchange rate to be maintained, thus the expected depreciation to 
be zero), the domestic interest rate  = .   Real interest rates in the GCC countries are not 
necessarily the same because expected inflation rates might differ.  There is a large literature on 
the relationship between the foreign interest rate and the domestic economy.  The foreign interest 
rate could operate through the effect on the expected real depreciation as we mentioned above; 
exports and in the case of the GCC, oil; and financial flows.  For a discussion and review of this 








(6)     ,   ) ; ; ; (
* * ζ t t t
O
t t Y R S P f Y =
 
Putting all together, the model consists of the following system of equations, where the subscript 
GCC countries, i.e., a panel and lowercase variables denote the natural log.  6 , 2 , 1 K = i
 
(7)   it it it t t it it it it d ToT p m p m q q 7 15 14
*
13 12 11 1 11 ] ˆ ) ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ε α α α α α α + + + − + − − + = −
(8)     it it it y p m 8 21 ) ( ε α + = −  
(9)       it it it t it s p p p 9
*
31 31 ) )( 1 ( ) ( ˆ ε α α + + − + =
(10)       it t t it
o




42 41 ) ( ε α α α + + + + =
  5 
The model has several asset prices: the exchange rate (endogenous), real money balances 
(endogenous), foreign  real interest rate (exogenous) and real oil price (exogenous).  Real output 
is endogenous.  All foreign variables are strictly exogenous.  The term of trade is most probably 
exogenous.  There are more exogenous than endogenous variables in the model.  The model is 
identifiable; it satisfies the rank and order conditions.   
 
The model predicts that an increase in domestic real money balances depreciates the real 
exchange rate 0 12 > α . (positive sign denotes depreciation).  
  
The increase in the foreign real money balances due to the central bank sells of foreign reserves 
for domestic money appreciates the real exchange rate 0 13 < α .   
 
An increase in the term of trade will appreciate the real exchange rate, which is consistent with a 
voluminous literature showing the appreciation of the real exchange rate,  0 < 14 α .   
 
Real government expenditures increases real output and appreciates the real exchange rate as a 
result of an excess demand for real balances that results in an increase in the real interest rate 
above the world real interest rate - assuming expectations are unchanged. To restore the 
equilibrium real exchange rate at its level the central bank buys foreign assets, i.e., increase the 
money supply).    
 
We expect that 0 15 < α , i.e., an increase appreciates the real exchange rate.  In the real money 
balances equation 0 21 > α .  Given financial innovations in the GCC countries are not expected to 
be as high as those in Europe, the US and other advanced countries we expect 21 α to be greater 
than one perhaps. 
 
In the real output equation, higher oil prices increase income of the GCC countries because they 
are major exporters of oil, so 41 α is expected to be positive.  The foreign real interest rate is 
predicted to have a negative effect on domestic production,   0 42 < α , see Giovanni and 
Shambaugh (2006).  Foreign real output has a positive effect on domestic output,  0 > 43 α .   
 
The restriction that domestic money and 0foreign money coefficients in the exchange rate 
equation sum to zero will be tested, i.e.,  0 13 12 = +α α .  The restriction in the price equation will 
also be tested, i.e., 31 α and ) 1 ( 31 α − . After we estimate the model above we solve it for the real 
exchange rate and compute the effect of the real oil price on the real exchange rate. 
 
III.  The conditional variability of the system 
 
Pegging the exchange rate to a stable foreign currency or to a basket of currencies aims at 
providing an anchor.  Stability of the currency that a country pegs to is an issue considered by 
the theory of the Optimum Currency Areas literature (Mundell, 1961).  So the second question of 
this paper arises; could a Euro dollar peg have provided more stability to the GCC economies 
than the US dollar peg?   
  6 
Our idea is to test whether the conditional variance of the model, which consists of four 
equations, has remained constant against the alternative hypothesis that it increased, in both the 
US dollar peg and Euro dollar peg.   
 
The conditional variance is the variance of the residuals of the model.  The residuals of the 
system in equations 7 to 10 above are distributed multivariate standard normal with a zero mean 
and a variance – covariance matrix∑ .  The variance – covariance matrix is symmetric and 
diagonal  .    Ρ × Ρ
 
Let a statisticω , which could have any distribution, measure certain features of the residualsε  
such as the variance.  If  ) 1 0 ( < < δ ωδ denotes the  fractile of the distribution of
th ) 1 δ − ( ω then 
δ ω satisfies the equation: 
 
(11)     δ ω ω δ = > ) ( prob  
 
We define a zone forω under some common distribution by defining upper and lower critical 
limits such that ω stays within.  In other words, whenω exceeds the critical limits it is considered 
a significant value (i.e., falling in the tails of the distribution).   
 
For a multivariate normal variable [ ]
T T
Ρ = ε ε ε ε L 2 1, , where eachε isiid , and 
if ) 1 ( δ − probability is maintained on each component, then the probability that all variables 
Ρ ε ε ε L 2 1, are simultaneously falling within the upper and lower critical limits is 
 
(12)       
Ρ − = − ) 1 ( 1 δ ϕ
 
The probability of falling outside the critical limit is 
 
(13)      
Ρ − − = ) 1 ( 1 δ ϕ
 
To satisfy a probability of  ϕ − 1 that all variables are falling within the critical limits on one 
sample when the parameters are the nominal values,δ must be: 
 
(14)      
Ρ − − =
/ 1 ) 1 ( 1 ϕ δ
 
For a multivariate normal like in the residual matrix above, the variance (of the population) is a 
function  called the Generalized Variance, which is the determinant of the matrix Σ . The 
determinant of is called the Sample Generalized Variance, where is the sample covariance 




7 Anderson (1958) shows that a convenient statistic for the 
generalized variance is the following form of the sample generalized variance: 
 

















n D 0 >  
 
And  .  m k L 2 , 1 =
 










j kj i ki ij x x x x
n 1
2 ) )( (
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Unfortunately, for  >3, the statistic has no exact distribution so we cannot test for 
significance.  It turned out that we can approximate the distribution by a 
Ρ k D
Γ(Gamma) distribution 
with two parameters, a shape and a scale parameter, Ganadesikan and Gupta (1970).  They 
showed that the   distribution is better approximated when  Γ 10 = n .  
 
The shape parameter is: 
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To simplify the interpretation of the statistic  we transform the  k D Γdistribution into a standard 
normal by computing the following:  
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Where is the distribution function of the Gamma distribution with the two parameters above, 
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) ( k D R is distributed standard normal and therefore the values could be  ) ( 0 ) ( k k D R D R < < .  
This should not be confused with a negative variance.    
  8 
We will compute the statistics Α Γ ≈ , h k D ,  and  k u ) , 0 ( ) ( μ N D R k ≈  for the estimated residuals of 
the model.  Then for both the US dollar peg and the Euro dollar peg, we test whether the 
conditional variance  for each country has significantly increased or not.  A significant 
increase implies values of > 
) ( k D R
) ( k D R σ 2 ±  or >  σ 3 ± . The  σ 3 ±  limits constitute a zone of 
0.99730 intervals for the values of , which is also true for non-standard normal 
distribution (Tchebysheff’s theorem).  
) ( k D R
 
Values of  exceeding  ) ( k D R σ 3 ±  are considered very significant changes in the conditional 
variance.   
 
IV. Data and estimation  
 
The data we use are annual from 1970 to 2006 when the foreign country is the US, and from 
1991 to 2006 when the foreign country is the European Union.  All data are in natural logs 
except the interest rate.  Foreign real interest rates are the nominal 90-day rate minus last period 
inflation rate as a proxy for expected inflation.  All data are from the IMF data base.  Figures 5 to 
12 plot the remaining data. 
 
All the data have trend except the US real interest rate (the 90-day interest rate minus last period 
inflation as a proxy for expected inflation).  Kuwait’s GDP (figure 7) has a break during the Gulf 
War I in 1990.  The common unit root tests that we use are not designed to handle breaks in the 
data; they confuse the break with a unit root.  Also, most of the unit root tests have low powers, 
some relatively different from others.  We test the data for unit root using common unit root tests 
for time series and panel data.
8  We could not reject the hypothesis that the log-level data have 
unit roots, except for the real interest rate.   
 
Whether the variables in the panel are cointegrated or not is another concern, but we will 
estimate the regressions in first differences (except for the US real interest rate) for several 
reasons.  First, first differenced regression is approximately the same as fixed effect models and 
this is precisely what we want to estimate to account for the country-effect i.e., heterogeneity.
9  
Second, we are interested in the short-run because the exchange rate and the price of oil are asset 
prices, which are very persistent (i.e., unit root, near random walk or random walk) so the long 
run is very long.  Typically, when good and asset price inflations are high the lags are short 
relative to the lags when good and asset inflations are low.  Third, to compute the Generalized 
Sample Variance for the residuals, they have to be I (0), which is guaranteed when we estimate 
our system in first differences because the levels are I (1).  Fourth, testing the hypothesis of no 
cointegration in a panel, and a system of equations, is dicey when N (the number of cross 
sections) is small (6 observations only) and T (the length of time series sample ) is not so long 
(35 observations at most and in the Euro dollar system is 15 only).   
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the log-differenced data (except the real interest rates).  
These are period averages.  The average real exchange rate depreciations are between -1 and -3 
percent depending on the foreign currency involved.  But in 2006 all the currencies appreciated 
significantly in real terms, up to 13 percent for the UAE.  Real money balance grew at rates 
  9between 6 to 8 percent on average across the GCC, quite fast compared with Europe and just as 
high as the US.  With exception of Kuwait, which experienced a high rate of growth in the term 
of trade, most GCC countries’ terms of trade grew between 3 and 5 percent on average.   
 
All GCC countries productivity differential with their major trading partners in tradable good 
sectors are either zero or negatives.  Relative to trading partners, the level of productivity in 
tradable goods in Bahrain increased in the mid 1980s, again in 2000 then flattened; increased 
right after the 1990s Gulf War I, then flattened in Kuwait; fluctuated wildly in Oman; increased 
in the 1990s in Qatar then flattened; increased in Saudi Arabia over the 1970s but has been 
declining since 1980; and finally it has been declining all the way from 1970 in the USE. 
Kuwait’s real GDP has a break during the Gulf War I in 1990/1991.  
 
Most of the RHS variables in equation 7 – 10 such as money, foreign money, the term of trade, 
oil prices, foreign real interest rate and foreign GDP, could be assumed exogenous.  Least 
Squares method is a reasonable initial estimator, except that the real depreciation rate equation of 
the differenced model includes a lagged dependent variable.  Thus, 0 ) , cov( 1 7 < Δ Δ − it it q ε  . Thus, 
the coefficient 11 α is biased downward in Lease Squares.  We would also expect the other 
coefficient estimates in the real exchange rate depreciation rate to be biased and inconsistent.  
For this problem and for robustness, we also report the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
results.  The instruments are several lags of the RHS variables because these variables are the 
ones that are readily available (see footnote of table 2 for the instruments).  These instruments 
provide reasonably long dynamic.  The number of instruments and the length of the lags have 
well-known disadvantages so we will restrict the number of the instruments to save some 
degrees-of-freedom.  We should interpret the coefficient estimates carefully.
10    
 
Table 2 reports four regressions.
11  The first two are with respect to the US dollar.  The second 
two are with respect to the Euro dollar.  For each case, we report Least Squares and GMM 
results.  The Euro dollar system implies (1) pegging to the Euro dollar and (2) oil is price in Euro 
dollar rather than US dollar.  The samples are different.  The effective sample sizes are also 
different depending on the number of instruments used in the GMM regressions.   
 
Lets begin with the US dollar regression.  All estimates are interpreted as averages over the GCC 
countries and over the sample period.  The real exchange rate depreciation rate does not seem 




Real money balances depreciate the real exchange rate, i.e., the sign is positive, and significant.
13  
The size of the coefficient 12 α , 0.63 (GMM) and 0.66 (Least Squares), which is relatively large.  
Foreign real money balances appreciate the real exchange rate, i.e., the sign is negative, and 
significant.  The coefficient 13 α is – 0.69 (GMM) and -0.54 (Least Squares).  These coefficients 
sum to zero as some of the exchange rate determination models predict.
14  
 
The term of trade also appreciates the real exchange rate, the sign of 14 α is negative, and the 
coefficient is significant.  The size is relatively larger in GMM.  It suggests that a one percent 
increase in the term of trade over last period’s value leads the depreciation rate to fall 
  10(appreciation) by about ½ percent in GMM and ¼ in Least Squares.  This results is consistent 
with most of the findings in the literature on the effect of the term of trade on the real exchange 
rate.  The GCC has experienced positive term of trade shocks lately because of the increase in 
the price of oil.  More than 70 percent of the GCC exports are oil and gas.
15 
 
Even though the model has productivity differential in tradable goods only, this variable is 
significant and has the right sign.
16  AAAA An increase in productivity in tradable goods sector 
at home relative to that of the trading partners appreciates the real exchange rate.  It increases the 
price of non-tradable goods relative to tradable good prices, and it may explain the latest 
increases in housing prices and services.   
 
We tried the level of government expenditures and the differential with the US and Europe. We 
also tried government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.  We found these variables 
insignificant in all regressions so we decided to drop them.    
 
The income elasticity of the demand for real money balances is small in the Least Squares 
regression, 0.21, which is similar to estimates found in the literature for advanced countries.  
However, it is not different from unity in GMM.
17  This magnitude is higher than the typical 
short-run elasticity we estimate for advanced countries.  Actually, we expected it to be a little 
larger than unity.  But it is clear that the GCC banking system has come a long way.  Financial 
services are very modern and the use of plastic cards and ATM is widespread, which might 
explain the surprisingly low elasticity.    
 
The price equation is estimated in an unrestricted form and the restriction is tested.  The 
restriction holds very well in the US dollar regressions.  In GMM, the coefficients 31 α (coefficient 
of the domestic price) and 32 α (coefficient of the foreign price) sum to one.
18 The result is self 
explanatory; on average more than 2/3 of the inflation in the GCC countries is imported from 
abroad, which is a very consistent feature of fixed foreign exchange rate regimes. 
 
In the final equation, an increase in the real price of oil has a positive effect on output.   
Remember that these countries are oil producing countries, where oil and gas make up more than 
2/3 of their production.  Our estimate suggests that a 100 percent increase in the real price of oil 
at Dubai increases real GDP growth by 5 percent, reasonably high.  A one percent increase in the 
US real interest rate reduces output growth in GCC by about 1 percent.  The magnitude seems 
large.  The easy monetary policy in the US, i.e., lower exchange rate and lower interest rate, 
might explain the expansionary phase in the GCC and the consequent inflationary pressures.  
The US growth rate of GDP has a significant and large effect on GDP growth in the GCC 
countries.  These results need no further explanation.    
 
Next, we computed the real exchange rate, foreign real money balances, foreign price, real oil 
price, foreign real interest rate and foreign real GDP in Euro dollar.  We re-estimated the model 
and reported the results in the last four columns of table 2.   Foreign real money balances have 
huge effect on the depreciation rate, several times larger than the effect in the US dollar 
regressions.  The restriction that the coefficients of the domestic and the foreign real money 
balances sum to zero is rejected by the Wald statistic.  The income elasticity of the demand for 
  11real money balances is pretty small and significant at the 10 percent level only.  Finally, about 90 
percent of domestic CPI inflation is imported.  The restriction that  1 = 32 31 +α α  is not rejected.
 19   
 
If these results were to be believable then the GCC countries, on average, would have been 
experiencing more imported inflation from Europe than under the current US dollar peg. This 
might be true since the GCC imports more goods and services from Europe than from the US.  In 
both the US dollar and the Euro dollar regressions, the statistic for the over-identifying 
restrictions of the instruments is insignificant so the hypothesis of over-identification cannot be 
rejected.   
J
 
We solve the model for  and compute the effect of the increase in the real price of oil on 
the real depreciation rate in the US dollar regression. We found that a 100 increase in real price 
of oil would appreciate the real exchange rate by 3 percent only.  The adverse effect on the 
competitiveness of the GCC is trivial.  For the Euro dollar regression, the effect of the increase in 
the real price of oil on the real depreciation rate is smaller by a magnitude of 10; a 100 percent 
increase in the real price of oil measured in Euro dollar would appreciate the real exchange rate 
by 0.30 percent only.   These results indicate that recent increase in the real price of oil has no 
significant effect on competitiveness on average. 
t q ln Δ
 
V.  Testing the conditional variability of the systems  
 
The system’s four equations for  ,  q Δ ) ( p m − Δ , p Δ , and  y Δ have the residuals matrix shown in 
appendix 2.  We have a four-column matrix and six countries stacked.  Using Least Square 
residuals, we have 35 observations for each country (1972-2006) in the US dollar system.   For 
the Euro dollar, we have 15 observation for each country (1992-2006).  For GMM we 28 and 11 
respectively because of the observations we lose for the instruments.   The smallest sample nis 
11.  Ganadesikan and Gupta (1970) show that a sample of minimum 10 observations is required 
to precisely estimate the Sample Generalized variance.   
 
Examining the residuals of all four regressions reported in table 2 indicates that all the residuals 
of the US dollar system are I (0).  The residuals of the Euro dollar system are much more 
difficult to test because of the small sample.  The unit root could not be rejected in a few tests.     
 
Figure 13 plots the 6 values of standard normal for the US and the Euro dollar cases 
from the Least Squares and the GMM regressions.  The US dollar test statistics are the light 
colors and the Euro dollar test statistics are the darker colors.  We could use either 
~ ) ( k D R
σ 2 ± or 
σ 3 ± as critical upper and lower limits beyond which the static is considered significant and the 
null hypothesis of stability is rejected.
20   
 
Both Bahrain and Kuwait are indifferent to whether they peg to the US dollar or the Euro dollar.   
Oman is much worse off Bahrain and Kuwait under the current US dollar peg than a hypothetical 
Euro peg.  For Least Squares, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also worse off under the current US 
dollar peg, but Saudi Arabia is much worse off than the UAE.   In GMM, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE are equally worse off under the current US dollar peg.  The three countries, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE could have been  better off pegging to the Euro.  Qatar is the only country 
  12that is worse off pegging to the Euro.  The question is why these countries are so different and 
segmented is an issue worth studying in future research.  
 
There is one concern about Kuwait.  Kuwait has pegged to a basket of currencies up until 2003, 
then pegged briefly to the US dollar, and back again to a basket in 2007 as we mentioned earlier.  
The weight of the US dollar is suspected to dominate all other currencies.  The question is 
whether Kuwait is affecting the results.  The statistics in figure 13 seem to suggest that this is not 
the case because Kuwait’s conditional variability is relatively low.  Nevertheless, we removed 




We asked two questions: what is the size of the effect of the rise in real oil prices on 
competitiveness? And, would the GCC countries been better off had they pegged their currencies 
to the Euro dollar in 1991?  We provided a small estimated model for the GCC countries, which 
consisted of four equations: the real exchange rate, real money balances, real output and the price 
level.  We estimated the model in first differences; used Least Squares and GMM for a  panel of 
the GCC countries; with a fixed effect for both the US dollar peg regime (1970-2006) and a 
hypothetical Euro- dollar peg regime (1991-2006).  We estimated the size of the effect of the rise 
in oil prices on the real exchange rate and then we provided a test statistic based on the Sample 
Generalized Variance for the variability of the system under each exchange rate peg, the US and 
the Euro dollar. 
 
Our estimates suggest that the increase in the real price of oil has a little effect on 
competitiveness – measured by the real depreciation rate.  Further, our estimates suggest that 
about 2/3 of the domestic CPI inflation in the GCC is imported under the US dollar peg system, 
and could have been up to 90 percent had the GCC countries pegged their currencies to the Euro 
dollar.  These estimates suggest that the GCC peg to the US dollar is probably less inflationary 
than the Euro.  Foreign real interest rate and foreign output growth have significant and large 
impacts on the GCC economies.  The increase in the real price of oil has a positive and 
significant impact on GDP growth. None of these results are surprising.  
 
Then we provided a test statistic for the conditional variability of the model.  We found that the 
GCC countries conditional variability differ significantly across member countries.   This result 
was a little surprising.  Both Bahrain and Kuwait are indifferent to whether they peg to the US 
dollar or the Euro dollar.  Oman is much worse off than Bahrain and Kuwait under the current 
US dollar peg. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the most affected by the peg to the US dollar.   It 
could be argued that these three  countries could have been much better off pegging to the Euro 
dollar.  Qatar is the only country that is worse off pegging to the Euro.  
 
To fix the domestic currency to another, a major and a stable one, is to provide an anchor to the 
economy.  The same principle applies for a basket, i.e., the currencies must provide stability to 
the local economy.  In the case of the US dollar peg, the GCC monetary policy must inevitably 
mimic the US monetary policy, i.e., domestic monetary policy is not independent.  Problems 
arise when shocks that affect the foreign economy whose currency is used as the anchor (the US 
economy) are different from the shocks affecting the domestic economy (the GCC).  For 
example, if the Federal Reserve Bank expects a recession it is expected that they will ease 
  13monetary conditions, i.e., lower the interest rate.  And when the current account deficit is large 
the US dollar “could be” left to depreciate until the imbalances are eliminated and equilibrium is 
restored.  Meanwhile, the GCC could be facing a different shock such as soaring oil prices, i.e., 
boom.  Swings in currencies are persistent.  In other words, the US dollar may continue to 
depreciate – if the US government does not intervene – until equilibrium in the current account is 
re-established.  So for the GCC to switch to another currency or a basket of currencies might 
only be a short-term relief, then what?  What will happen when the Euro dollar begins to slide at 
some point in the future?  The GCC countries could continue to peg their currencies to the US 
dollar and endure the pain, but for how long would they be willing to endure the pain?  It 
certainly depends on their tolerance level, the magnitude of the pain an the damage it might 
cause etc.  Alternatively, they could switch to the Euro or to a basket peg system, but the solution 
is also a short term one.  This is the policy problem.   
 
A more robust resolution to the problem lies in the government(s) choice between domestic price 
stability or currency stability.  The situation today is one where the GCC countries face different 
economic shocks than the US and their hands are tied behind their backs because the exchange 
rate is fixed to the US and monetary policy is ineffective and not independent.  Inflation is a 
serious issue that could undermine the GCC economies and most of it is imported because the 
current monetary arrangement.   
 
Economists agree that the exchange rate and domestic prices cannot be stabilized 
simultaneously.  The fixed exchange rate regime is a constraint.  It imposes a difficult trade-off 
between currency stability, monetary independence and capital market openness.  These three 
things maybe very difficult to have in the same time, i.e., the well-known tri-lemma (Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh and Taylor, 2004).   
 
It will all depend on the country’s preference.  (1) If the GCC countries want independent 
monetary policy and free capital mobility then they cannot fix the exchange rate because fixing 
the exchange rate does not allow for a monetary policy independence.  (2) If they want to enjoy 
higher incomes from higher oil prices and currency stability then they have to accept inflation 
and its consequences.  (3) If they want stable domestic inflation then they should let the currency 
float – an inflation targeting system coupled with a floating exchange rate.
21 Or, they could 
continue to peg the currency to the US dollar and endure the pain associated with its depreciation 
and higher domestic  inflation until the storm passes by.  Pegging to another currency or to a 
basket of currencies is neither a permanent solution nor the right question to ask.   
  14Footnotes   
1The CPI does not include oil prices and construction costs, the GDP deflator does.  The correlation between oil 
price inflation and the GDP deflator inflation is very high in all GCC countries.  There is no significant correlation 
between oil price inflation and the CPI inflation rate.  We do not plot or report the data to save space, but we are 
appy to provide the data on request. Data for the first three quarters show even more inflation.  h  
2Kuwait’s low average growth over the sample from 1970 to 2006 is due to the inclusion of Gulf War I period when 
DP collapsed.  G  
3 See also the IMF press release No. 07/241 on October 29, 2007.   
4 The GCC countries adopted a regime of hard exchange rate peg against the US dollar in 2003.  Kuwait pegged its 
currency to a basket of currencies since March 1975.  It switched to a USD dollar peg in January 2003 as a step 
towards monetary union for  the GCC.  Kuwait switched to a basket of currencies again in May 2007.  The US 
ollar is suspected to have the highest weight in the basket, but the weights are unknown to the public.   d  
5 There is a large literature on revaluations of nominal exchange rates under fixed peg systems.  Razzak (1995) 
reports some real effects of nominal revaluations in Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, these revaluations must be very 
arge in magnitudes and cannot be considered a useful policy recipe.   l  
6 The theory does not really say what measure of money.  Researchers tried almost all different definitions of money 
and reported mixed results, but most of the evidence of the 1970s and 1980s models of the exchange rate 
etermination found wrong signs.  d  
7 Anderson (1958) shows that the determinant of   is proportional to the sum of squares of the volumes of all 
parallelopes formed by using as principle edges
2 S
Ρvectors of  Ρ ε ε ε L , , 2 1  as one set of end points, and the mean 
ofε as the other with
Ρ − ) 1 (
1
n
 as the factor of proportionality. 
 
8 We used the Augmented Dickey- Fuller (1984),  Perron (1997), Phillips (1987), Elliott (1991), Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003),  Sarno and Taylor (1998) and Taylor and Sarno (1998)).  We estimated a 
variety of specifications (constant, time trend, etc.) and examined a variety of lag structures using different 
nformation Criteria.  I  
9 We could not allow all parameters to vary by country because we have a short sample and we would lose degrees-
f-freedom.    o  
10 For GMM see Wooldrige (2002).  We appeal to the facts that the estimator is appropriate when the economic 
model is not fully specified and that it is a robust estimator because it does not require information about the exact 
istribution of the error term.    d  
11 In all regressions, we use a robust Newey-West method to calculate the variance-covariance matrix.     
12 The level of the real exchange rate is a random walk, but the depreciation rate is not. The coefficients are 
tatistically significantly different from 1. The p-value of the Wald statistic is zero.  s  
13 Students of the exchange rate know that the literature on the monetary model of the exchange rate determination 
and the real interest rate differential model of the exchange rate determination is full of empirical studies that show 
hat money has the wrong sign and that the models’ restriction do not actually hold.  t  
14  The Wald statistic’s p-values to test this hypothesis are 0.8724 and 0.6828 for GMM and Least Squares 
espectively.    r  
15 We tried government expenditures, government expenditures to GDP ratio and the difference between 
government expenditures in the GCC countries and the US, and Europe.  We found the coefficient estimates to be 
nsignificant so we dropped these variables from the regressions.   i  
16 Productivity in non-tradable good sectors is very difficult to measure.  The productivity differential in tradable 
good sectors between the GCC and their major trading partners such as Europe, Asia and the US, is calculated by 
he IMF staff.  t  
17 We test whether 1 21 = α ; the Wald statistic’s p-value is 0.7938. 
18 The p-value of the Wald statistic is 0.4343. The restriction also holds in Least Squares; the Wald statistic’s p-
alue is 0.1257.    v   9 The p-value of the Wald statistic is 0.7693.  1  
20 The conditional variability measure is positive as usual, but our test statistic was converted to a standard normal 
o there are positive and negative values and should not be confusing.    s  
21Economists have not settled the debate on whether inflation targeting is superior to price level targeting.  We will 
not discuss the issue here because its time has not come up yet. 
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  18Table(1)  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Bahrain  Kuwait  Oman  Qatar  Saudi  Arabia  UAE  USA  Europe 



















0.11 -  - - - 
q Δ (EUR)  -0.007 0.11  -0.03  0.16  -0.01  0.12  -0.03 0.16 -0.01  0.12  -0.02 0.10  -  -  -  - 
) ( p m − Δ   0.07 0.18 0.05  0.13  0.08  0.13 0.07  0.17 0.08  0.12  0.06 0.23  -  -  -  - 
* ) ( p m− Δ   - - -  -  -  - -  - -  - -  -  0.07  0.16  0.03  0.02 
ToT Δ   0.02 0.11 0.08  0.27  0.05  0.27 0.03  0.29 0.05  0.25  0.05 0.22  -  -  -  - 



















0.07  - - - - 
s Δ  (US)  -0.006 0.02 -0.006  0.03  -0.002  0.03 -0.007 0.02 -0.005  0.02  -0.007 0.02  -  -  -  - 
s Δ  (EUR)  -0.000 0.09  0.000  0.09  0.004  0.10 -0.001  0.09 0.001  0.09  -0.000 0.09  -  -  -  - 
m Δ   0.11 0.18 0.10  0.09  0.14  0.13 0.15  0.13 0.15  0.15  0.16 0.19  -  -  -  - 

















0.18  - - - - 















- - - - 
o p Δ   - - -  -  -  - -  - -  - -  -  0.06  0.32  -  - 
o p Δ   - - -  -  -  - -  - -  - -  - - -  0.06  0.23 
* R   - - -  -  -  - -  - -  - -  -  0.05  0.026  0.03  0.014 
* y Δ   - - -  -  -  - -  - -  - -  -  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01 
 
All data are in natural logs except for the interest rates, asterisks denote the foreign magnitudes.  Nominal exchange rate  s defined as the domestic price of the foreign currency ( USD and Euro 
alternatively); is the GDP price deflator (2000=100) ; is the CPI (2000=100); is the real exchange rate; is money plus quasi money; is the term of trade (2000=100);   is tradable good 
productivity differential with trading partners; is real GDP (expenditure side); is the real price of oil (Dubai), and 
*is the foreign 90-day interest rate.  The source of the data is the IMF-IFS and 
the World Economic Report. 
p p ˆ q m ToT d ˆ
y 0 p R
X denotes the mean and S denotes the standard deviation.  The sample is 1970-2006 except for variables involving Europe, where the sample is 1991-2006. 
 
i  The numbers in boldface in parentheses are the values in 2006. 
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it it it t t it it it it d ToT p m p m q q 7 15 14
*
13 12 11 1 11 ] ˆ ) ( ) ( )[ 1 ( 7 ε α α α α α α Δ + Δ + Δ + − Δ + − Δ − + Δ = Δ −
it it it y p m 8 21 ) ( 8 ε α Δ + Δ = − Δ  
it t it it s p p p 9
*
32 31 ) ( ˆ 9 ε α α Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ  
it t t it
o




42 41 ) ( 10 ε α α α Δ + Δ + + + Δ = Δ  
  USD (1970-2006)  Euro (1991-2006) 
 Least  Squares  GMM
iii Least Squares  GMM
iv
Parameters coefficient  p-  value  coefficient  p-value coefficient p-value coefficient  p-value
10 α   -0.03 0.0003  -0.01  0.1737 0.01 0.6977 0.03  0.0212 
11 α   0.30 0.0000  0.13  0.0001 0.23 0.0289 0.02  0.0001 
12 α   0.66 0.0000  0.63  0.0000 0.93 0.0001 1.60  0.0000 
13 α   -0.54 0.0848  -0.69  0.0876 -2.20 0.0001 -4.06  0.0000 
14 α   -0.25 0.0000  -0.52  0.0000  0.004 0.9697 -0.31  0.0004 
15 α   -0.14 0.1313  -0.35  0.0006 -0.07 0.7717  -1.1 0.0000 
20 α   0.06 0.0000  0.02  0.1405 0.06 0.0000 0.05  0.0000 
21 α   0.21 0.0769  1.08  0.0007 0.21 0.0772 0.11  0.1664 
30 α   0.006 0.2860  -0.01  0.1044 0.01 0.0000 0.01  0.0000 
31 α   0.15 0.0000  0.39  0.0000 0.07 0.0038 0.09  0.0009 
32 α   0.70 0.0045  0.74  0.0000 0.03 0.2582 0.89  0.0002 
40 α   0.02 0.0712  0.03  0.0061 0.05 0.0000 0.05  0.0000 
41 α   0.06 0.0012  0.05  0.0287 0.01 0.5701 0.04  0.0002 
42 α   -1.04 0.0003  -1.08  0.0000 -0.94 0.0521 -1.60  0.0000 
40 α   1.20 0.0002  1.04  0.0007 0.63 0.4074 1.20  0.0004 
 4.02E-09
i 3.74E-09
i 2.45E-10 9.72E-11 




i-Determinant of the residuals covariance matrix. 
ii-J statistic to test for the over-identification of the instruments, distributed. 
iii-The instruments are all in first differenced form and include a constant in every equation: eq. (8) [trend, eight lags of the term of trade, four lags of 
productivity differential, and four lags of government expenditures]; (9) [four lags of foreign real GDP, eight lags of the nominal price of oil, two 
lags of the nominal spot exchange rate, and four lags of foreign real GDP]; eq. (10) [four lags of the US price level] and eq. (11) [eight lags of the 
nominal price of oil and eight lags of the nominal exchange rate]. Kernel is Bartlett, Bandwidth fixed equal to 4, no pre-whitening, coefficients 
iterated after one-step weighting matrix.  Convergence achieved after 1 weight matrix and 6 total coefficient iterations. 
iv- The instruments: eq. (8) [four lags of the term of trade, four lags of the real money balances, four lags of the foreign real money balances, and 
four lags of productivity differential]; eq. (9) [four lags of foreign real GDP]; eq. (10) [four lags of domestic price level] and eq. (11) [four lags of the 
nominal price of oil 
and four lags of the nominal exchange rate.  Kernel is Bartlett. Bandwidth is fixed equal to 3. no pre-whitening, coefficients iterated after one-step 
weighting matrix.  Convergence achieved after 1 weight matrix and 6 total coefficient iterations.  The restriction in equation (10) that 
1 32 31 = +α α is tested and the Wald statistic P-values are 0.1257, 0.4343, 0.00 and 0.7693 in the four regressions respectively. 
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We sum of the CPI and the GDP deflator for each country and take the average then we average across the six GCC countries. 
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  33Appendix 1: Data  
 
 
Variable   
s   Nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic price of a unit of a foreign currency 
(increase means depreciation) 
p  Domestic GDP deflator (2000=100) 
* p   Foreign GDP deflator (2000=100) 
p ˆ   Domestic CPI (2000=100) 
q   p p s − +
*  
m   Domestic money plus quasi money 
* m   Foreign money plus quasi money 
tot   Term of trade index (2000=100) 
d ˆ   Tradable good productivity differential with the GCC trading partners 
y   Domestic expenditure side real GDP (production side GDP is not available) 
* y   Foreign expenditure side real GDP 
o p   Dubai price of oil in US dollars deflated by the last period CPI 
* R   The 90-day real interest rate measured by the 90-day rate minus last period inflation 
rate as a proxy for expected inflation 
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BAH=Bahrain; KWT=Kuwait; OMN=Oman; QTR=Qatar; SAD=Saudi Arabia; and 
UAE=United Arab Emirates. 
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